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III.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) (1992);
Utah Rule of Appellant Procedure 32 (1992);
Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-18 (1992);
Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1992);
Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-2 (1992).
The foregoing provisions are set forth in full in the

addendum hereto,
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

INTRODUCTION
Appellee Bailey-Allen Company, Inc. ("Appellee") was not

entitled to damages in this case.
existed between Appellant

A valid, enforceable contract

and Appellee and, because Appellee

breached the contract, it was improper to award Appellee damages
under the contract.
parties

was

Moreover, because the relationship of the

governed

by

contract,

and

because

the

court

specifically found that Appellee did not fulfill its obligations
under the contract to direct and supervise the construction, it was
improper to grant relief under a theory of unjust enrichment for
Appellee's services in directing and supervising the construction.
The Court also erred in failing to award Appellants their
attorney fees incurred in successfully bringing a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Appellee's causes of action based on
the Mechanic's Lien Statute and on the Construction Bond Statute.
69654
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Both

statutes provide

prevailing party.

for an award of attorney fees to the

Finally, the trial court erred in awarding

prejudgment and post-judgment interest.

Prejudgment interest was

not available because the amount of damages was unliquidated until
judgment was entered.

Post-judgment interest, if any, should have

run from the date judgment was entered, not from the date the trial
court granted Appellee's Motion to Compel Filing of Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment.
B.

APPELLEE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES EITHER ON THE
CONTRACT OR UNDER A THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
1.

Appellee Was Not Entitled to Damages Under the
Contract.

As discussed in the Brief of Appellant, Appellee was not
entitled to damages under the contract because the trial court
found that Appellee did not obtain evidence of insurance and did
not perform his contractual obligation to direct and supervise the
construction. (R. 217.)
Is its Brief, Appellee has argued that it should have
been paid for "pre-breach," or "previously-earned" contractor fees
in the case of default during construction.
13.)

(Brief of Appellee at

In fact, Appellee's failure to obtain insurance put Appellee

in breach of the contract from the moment the contract was signed.
There was no period of time, therefore, that was "pre-breach."
Nevertheless, Appellee contends that the construction contract did
not prohibit payment for pre-breach services, that the parties did
69654
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not intend such a result, that the contract should be construed
against Appellants who drafted the agreement, and that the trial
court was free to interpret the contract as allowing an award of
"previously earned" contractor fees.
Assuming for the sake of argument that Appellee is
correct on all these points, Appellee is still not entitled to
damages under the contract because the trial court found that
Appellee failed to adequately perform the services upon which
compensation was contingent. In other words, regardless of how the
damages provision is interpreted, Appellee is not entitled to
enforce the contract because it was the breaching party.

See,

Nielsen v. Wang, 613 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1980) ("The rule in Utah
is that to recover on a contract, a contractor must first establish
his own performance

[or] a valid excuse for his failure to

perform."); Liddle v. Petty. 816 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Mont. 1991) (If
one contracting party materially breaches the contract, the other
is entitled to suspend his performance).
Appellee was terminated because it failed to properly
discharge its duties as general contractor to direct and supervise
the construction.

(R. 217.)

Throughout its Brief, Appellee has

admitted its breach for failure to obtain insurance, but it has
utterly ignored the trial court's determination that Appellee
breached its obligation to direct and supervise the construction.
The trial court found Appellee had not only failed to obtain
69654
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insurance, but it failed to properly perform its services as
general contractor, failed to spend sufficient time on the job,
failed to take care of matters promptly as they arose, failed to
move the work forward, failed to respond to questions concerning
the construction and failed to give the project the kind of
attention Appellee knew it required under the contract.
R. 217,)

The trial court concluded

(R. 801;

that these deficiencies

constituted a material breach of the contract and that "the
defendant

was

justified

terminating the contract."

in

terminating

(R. 801.)

the

relationship,

The court also found that

Appellants were not in breach of the contract in any way.
Appellee failed to establish, and the trial court did not
conclude that Appellee had "earned" any amount whatsoever from
performing pre-breach services under the contract.

In its Brief,

Appellee has cited several entries in Appellants' log book that
Appellee suggests are indications that Appellee provided some
compensable service.

Mr. Kurzet recorded that "there was good

progress on framing, " and that he felt that "things were going
okay."

(R. 608-09.)

Appellee is eager to step forward and claim

credit for the progress that was made during the period of time he
was general contractor.

But, as discussed in Appellants' Brief,

the progress on construction that was made during the period that
Appellee was on the job was not due to Appellee's effort.
Brief of Appellant at 26-29) .
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:r-ri

. . ., \j

- :h

*~he ti-

contract.

fc

\ ; *

-

.i^eliee dxd not
Neither

p^iy

* * ' '

hat- challenged - ;,dc

'*c* '"-ntitl^d to compensation

f- r the pre-breach serviced s.*i;pj

• - '"

Having ^reached the provision
payment

fc

contingent,

'
t-\

Appellants
which iipp.t-. .

r t :it .oncid^

IU sup^rv^sir • r ^

p- a et

«.

pnf

f

-*,

construction

*.^^h
wa ;
- „nst

-* * I:ee's arguments about *».*-• measure ot dani^^s to
_

\titiea cxre ^n^irely irrelevant.

Appellee did not perioiih tnt= icMuirpd SPT*V. . .
, uherefore, there were no grounds on which Appellee could have

69 65 4

6

been entitled to compensation for pre-termination services under
the contract.
2.

Appellee Was Not Entitled to Recover Under a Theory
of Uniust Enrichment.

Recovery under a theory of unjust enrichment "presupposes
that no enforceable written or oral contract exists."
Olsen, 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

Davies v.

Under Utah law, an

award for unjust enrichment is usually not available when an
enforceable contract exists.

See, Karapanos v. Boardwalk Fries.

Inc. , 837 P.2d 576, 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

When an express

construction contract exists, quantum meruit may be proper, if at
all, only when a contractor is required to perform work outside the
scope of the contract, or when a contractor justifiably ceases work
or is unjustifiably terminated.

Highland Const. Co. v. Union

Pacific Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) (dictum);
Davies, 683 P. 2d at 1048 (dictum) . Appellee has cited no Utah law
to support the notion that the remedy of unjust enrichment is
available under the facts of this case. A valid contract existed
between Appellants and Appellee and there are no circumstances that
would invoke an exception to the rule and justify an award of
unjust enrichment.
Assuming, arguendo, that the theory of unjust enrichment
were applicable here, it still would have been error here to award
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* ~ ~ r — ^ T-*?- *,< * - ,-. construction had been

completed, Appellants i cCtivtw

-~

gu an turn

completed whiie Appellee was ^tueial contia.

cc

caused

-.

ow^^_:

construction was
Th^

" •• ^ awaid

tnat

^o:,ferreu

Iiie cuuit

d-._

not and could not base the award on the value of the benefit that
Appellee actually conferred on Appellant.
Appellee has contended that it is entitled to $5,500.00
under an unjust enrichment theory for negotiating the purchase of
lumber.

Appellee argues that those services were not part of

obtaining "competitive bids" as stated in the contract because the
lumber, although not paid for, had already been delivered to the
site.

Appellee counted up the lumber, decided that the price was

too high, and recommended that Appellants pay $5,500.00 less than
the asking price.
lumber because

Appellee did not obtain the initial bid on the

Appellee

had

not

yet

been

hired

as

general

contractor.

There is very little difference, however, between

obtaining

reasonable

a

price

based

on

competitive

obtaining a reasonable price from one supplier.

bids

and

The trial court

did not find that such duties fell outside the scope of the
contract.

See Highland Const. Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,

683 P.2d at 1048 (dictum that unjust enrichment doctrine might
apply when work is outside the scope of contract) .
Appellee

saved

Appellant

$5,500.00, the

Appellee's contractual duties.

service

was

Assuming
one of

Appellee is not entitled to keep

for himself the amount saved.
Appellee has contended that fairness does not require
"previously earned" compensation to be forfeited upon a breach of
contract by Appellee.
69654
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t

hypothetical
>« • I i u t 1

\\

t-*i";•'

10

because

:i t refuses

to

i nuu merely because it

failed to provide evidence of adequate insurance, but because it
did not perform its duties as general contractor. Appellee's "pretermination services" were simply not adequately rendered and the
trial court was correct in finding that Appellee breached the
contract in that respect.

Under the circumstances, fairness does

not require that Appellee receive $10,000.00. Indeed, it would be
unfair to those who eventually completed the job and to Appellants
to require Appellants to pay for services inadequately performed or
never undertaken.
Appellee has attempted to divert attention from its nonperformance by discussing only what the proper remedy should be and
by pretending that Appellee's only breach of the contract was its
failure to provide evidence of adequate insurance. The law in Utah
clearly holds that when a valid contract exists, a claim for unjust
enrichment is improper.
P. 2d at

578.

Karapanos v. Boardwalk Fries, Inc., 837

In order

for a

contractor

to recover

on a

construction contract, it must first establish its performance
under the contract.
19 80).

Nielsen v. Wang, 613 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah

The relation of the parties was governed by the contract

and, even though certain terms of the contract were ambiguous, the
trial court did not have the latitude to reform the parties'
obligations in favor of a theory of unjust enrichment.

The trial

court's award of damages was error and should be vacated.
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Farm

Moreover,

J:-IUUULLIUU

CL^JL^.

Neither Paul Mueller Company
j fees altogether

12

when

the applicable

statute

requires

an award.

Appellant

is

entitled to reasonable attorney fees as the prevailing party in an
action under the Mechanic's Lien Statute.
Attorney fees under the Bond Statute are also mandatory.
There are several provisions addressing an award of attorney fees
under the bond statute:
In an action for failure to obtain a bond, the
court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to
the prevailing party.
These fees shall be
taxed as costs in the action.
Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 14-2-2 (3) (1993) .

The

foregoing

provision

specifically addresses the failure of a property owner to obtain a
payment bond.

A more general provision under the same chapter,

however, mandates an award of fees to the prevailing party in all
actions under the Bond Statute:
In any suit upon a payment bond under this
chapter, the court shall award reasonable
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party.
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1(7)

(emphasis added).

The Bond Statute,

thus, provides for mandatory attorney fees to a prevailing party in
any action brought under the statute.
Appellee has argued that it was proper for the trial
court to deny fees altogether because Appellants' counsel "made no
attempt

to

distinguish

its

services

rendered

on

the

enrichment claim from the other two causes of action."
Appellee

69654
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That

statement

13

is

inaccurate.

unjust

(Brief of

Appellants'

counsel

submitted an affidavit

of attorney's

fees and costs

itemizing the time spent on bringing its successful Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.
award

of

attorney

(R. 111-114.)

fees because

Appellee objected to an

Appellants'

counsel

segregated the time with respect to causes of action.

had not
(R. 117.)

Appellant's counsel explained and defended his request
for fees in Appellant's Response to Plaintiff's Objections to
Proposed Judgment.

(R. 122-24.)

Appellants' counsel stated that

the majority of his time spent on the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment was spent on the mechanic lien argument and the bond
argument. Indeed, Appellant's 10-page Memorandum in Support of its
Motion

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment

contains

addressing the unjust enrichment cause of action.
unjust

enrichment

argument

is

very

simple

only

one page

(R. 72-73.) The
and,

unlike

the

mechanic's lien and bond arguments, it refers to no case law or
statute.

Research on the unjust enrichment case was confined to

Black's Law Dictionary.

(R. 72.) Appellant's Reply Memorandum in

Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment does not even
mention the unjust enrichment claim.

(R. 96-99.)

There is ample

evidence in the pleadings themselves to indicate that Appellant's
counsel spent virtually no time on the unjust enrichment cause of
action and Appellants' counsel explained as much to the trial
court.

To fail to make an award altogether in the face of such

evidence was an abuse of discretion.
69654
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The issue of attorney fees

should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of the
appropriate fee.
D.

THE AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD BE VACATED,
Under Utah law, prejudgment interest is available on

liquidated amounts.

It is generally unavailable in actions in

equity because the amount of an award

in equity

is usually

unliquidated until judgment is entered.

Shoreline Development,

Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Appellee has misstated the holding of Shoreline.
case does not

"provide [] for an award of interest in unjust

enrichment cases tried directly to the court."
at 2 7.)

That

(Brief of Appellee

That issue was not before the court in Shoreline.

The

case was tried to a jury and, consequently, the Court of Appeals'
decision focused on the risk of double recovery when the court
cannot know whether the jury's award includes interest.
211.

Id.

at

In all equity cases, however, the trier of fact must use its

discretion to determine the proper amount of the award.

Thus,

damages are usually, if not always, unliquidated at the time the
cause of action arises

and thus not

subject

to prejudgment

interest.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "where damages are
incomplete or cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy
. . . the amount of the damage must be ascertained and assessed by
the trier of fact at the trial, and in such cases prejudgment
69654
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interest is not allowed."

Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 560

P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977) (emphasis added).

In the present case,

the amount of damages was not liquidated until judgment was
entered.

The trial court based its award on the grounds that

"approximately" 10 percent of the work had been completed based on
the architect's testimony of "less than 10 percent," although the
court noted that "counsel did not tie him down to a figure."
803.)

(R.

In fact, the trial court had already determined that the

amount was not liquidated.

(R. 299, Reporter's Transcript of

Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Scheduling
Conference

at

pp. 12-15;

R.

128, Order

of

Partial

Summary

Judgment.)
Finally, Appellee is simply wrong in stating that this is
not a case of equity. Unjust enrichment sounds in equity and, for
the reasons stated by the Court in Shoreline and Bjork, prejudgment
interest is inappropriate in the present case.
E.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD
BE VACATED,
Post-judgment

judgment is "rendered."

interest

is appropriate from the time

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 54(e).

Appellee argues that "rendered" means verbally rendered from the
bench.

69654

It has cited no case from any jurisdiction to support this
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contention.

Most courts, including Utah, hold that a judgment is

"rendered" when it is entered.1
Appellee has argued that because the trial court granted
Appellee's

motion

to

compel

Appellants

to

prepare

and

file

Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, post-judgment interest should
run from the date that the Motion was granted. As explained in the
Brief of Appellant, the delay in filing the proposed findings of
fact was

occasioned

by Appellant's

substitution

of counsel.

Appellee could have moved for sanctions, but did not.
Finally, Appellee has argued that because the amount of
post-judgement interest at issue here is small, it would not be
unfair to allow the trial court's ruling to stand.
Appellee at 31.)

The amount of interest is immaterial.

(Brief of
The law

does not permit post-judgment interest to run prior to the date
judgment is entered and there is no reason that the law should not
be followed in this case. The trial court's award of post-judgment
interest should be vacated.

1

See Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corp., 754 P.2d 984
(Utah Ct. App. 19 85) (post-judgment interest runs from the date of
entry of new judgment, not from date of previous erroneous
judgment); National Steel Construction Co. v. National Union Fire
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 543 P.2d 642 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (error
to impose interest from the date of court's oral decision rather
than from the date judgment was entered); Pure Gas & Chemical Co.
v. Cook, 526 P.2d 986, 993 (Wyo. 1974) (error to grant postjudgment interest from the date of the verdict, rather than date
judgment was entered).
69654
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CONCLUSION
This case is not about fashioning a proper remedy.

The

major issue in this case is whether Appellee was entitled to any
remedy at all. For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set
forth in the Brief of Appellant, the award of damages was error and
should be vacated.
Under both the Mechanics' Lien Statute and the Bond
Statute, the prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees. There
was sufficient evidence as to the amount of those fees and, while
the trial court had discretion to determine the appropriate amount
of attorney fees, it was an abuse of discretion to deny fees
altogether.
Finally, the award of prejudgment and post-judgment
interest should be vacated because an award of damages was not
warranted in this case.

Even assuming the award of damages was

proper, prejudgment interest is not available because the amount of
damages was not liquidated until the Court entered judgment. Postjudgment interest, if any, should run from the date judgment was
entered and not before that date.
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons stated in
the Brief of Appellants, the award of damages and of prejudgment
and post-judgment interest was contrary to law and should be
vacated.

The case should be remanded to the trial court with

instructions to determine and award Appellants their reasonable
69654
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attorney fees incurred in bringing their Motion for Partial SummaryJudgment on the Mechanic's Lien Statute and the Bond Statute.

4K

DATED this ^T)"

day of August, 1993.

LL

•^Bfc4*±.

SPENCER
.USTIN
WILLIAM
IVANS
of and^
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)

ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
WILLIAM J. EVANS, being duly sworn says that he is
employed in the law offices of PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER, attorneys
for Appellants, that he has this day caused to be served by hand
delivery two copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS and
a copy of this Affidavit of Service to the following at the address
shown below:
Bruce J, Nelson
Allen Nelson Rasmussen & Christensen
215 S. State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this
day of August,
1993.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this "50
August, 1993.

day of

vtL-£^.^Lj
NOTARY
ARY PUBLIC
i
Resi d i n g at;"? / o A , \ / \ _*JL. JMlrflft
My Commission E x p i r e s :

NOTARY PUBLIC

SHEILA P. LAND
201 South Main #1800
Salt Laka City. Utah 84147
My Commission Expires
August 3.1997
STATE OF UTAH
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V. ADDENDUM

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Judgment
Construction Contract
Determinative Rules and Statutes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) (1992)
Rule of Appellate Procedure 32 (1992)
Code Ann. § 14-2-1(7) (1992)
Code Ann. § 14-2-2 (1992)
Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1992)

ADDENDUM A

ADDENDUM A

jb 1 L E D
SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150)
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276)
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

oc;
Clerk of Summit County

BX.

DtpvtyCltrt
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC.,
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs,
STANLEY M. KURZET, an
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees
for THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST;
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and
John Does 1 through 10,

Civil No. 10870

Defendants.
* * * * * * * *

This action, having been tried to the Court, and the
Court, having considered the evidence and the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, hereby makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that the parties intended to and

did enter into a written contract wherein plaintiff agreed to act

000214

as the general contractor and to oversee the construction of
defendants1 residence in Park City, Utah.
2.
ties provided

The Court finds that the contract between the parthat

plaintiff

would

complete

construction

on

defendants1 residence within one year and, in return, defendant
would pay plaintiff $100,000 consideration for plaintiff's services in directing and supervising the construction, and $22.00
per hour for plaintiff's own hands-on labor.
3.

The Court

finds that plaintiff

was aware that

defendants had experienced problems with prior general contractors and had terminated two general contractors for unsatisfactory performance.

Plaintiff was also aware that Mr. Kurzet was a

meticulous and demanding individual and would require exacting
performance of the contract.
4.

The Court finds the parties intended and the con-

tract provided for plaintiff, within 10 days after entering into
the contract, to provide defendants with evidence of adequate
liability insurance covering its work pursuant to the contract.
5.

The

Court

finds

that

plaintiff

represented

to

defendants that plaintiff had $1 million in liability insurance
coverage in force at the time the parties entered into the contract on July 3, 1990, that defendants wanted $4-5 million in
coverage, and that plaintiff later discovered its policy was only

-2-
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for $300# 000 coverage and that it had been cancelled on October
24, 1989.

6.

The Court finds that, in a memorandum of July 20,

1990 from defendants to plaintiff, which was delivered to Michael
Kent, defendants notified plaintiff that plaintiff had not yet
provided the necessary certificate evidencing insurance coverage
and that defendants required such evidence under the terms of the
contract.
7.

The court find that defendants terminated plain-

tiff's services on October 2, 1990.
8.

The Court finds, that about 10% of the construc-

tion project was completed while plaintiff was general contractor
and, based on that percentage, defendants received a benefit from
plaintiff's

pre-termination

services

in the amount

of

$10,000

regardless of whether plaintiff performed its duties under the
contract.
9.

The Court finds that defendants realized a benefit

of $5,500 which represents the amount saved by defendants through
plaintiff's services involving negotiations for the purchase of
lumber.

-3-
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CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
1.

The Court concludes that the subject contract was

ambiguous and incomplete as drafted and that the Court has a
responsibility to add to it and to look upon it as an oral contract between the parties.
2.

The

Court

concludes

that

the contract

can be

interpreted as written.
3.

The Court concludes that given the amount of the

subject contract and the cost of the construction, plaintiff had
a duty to inquire into the adequacy of its insurance coverage for
the project, but did not.
4.

The Court concludes that plaintiff's failure to

promptly provide evidence of adequate liability insurance was a
material breach of the contract.
5.

The Court concludes that defendants were justified

in terminating plaintiff's services for plaintiff's breach of its
obligation to promptly provide evidence of adequate liability
insurance.
6.

The Court concludes that defendants were justified

in terminating plaintiff's services because plaintiff spent very
few hours on the job site and did not give the construction
project the attention that it required under the contract and
that plaintiff knew Mr. Kurzet would expect.

-4-
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7.

The Court concludes that defendants are not in

breach of the contract in any way.
8.

With

respect

to

plaintiff's

Unjust

Enrichment

Claim, the Court has considered several alternative methods of
calculating any award to plaintiff under such a theory.

The

Court concludes the most logical basis to be the percentage of
defendants1 residence that was completed during the period plaintiff was on the job.
9.

The Court rejects plaintiff's proposal that it

should receive 1/4 or $25,000, of the $100,000 consideration contemplated under the contract because it spent three months on the
job, or one quarter, of the one-year period for constructing the
residence as contemplated under the contract.

The Court finds

that such a proposal is unreasonable and unsupported by the
facts.
10.

The Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to

receive $15,500 from defendant in quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between plaintiff and defendants,
$10,000 representing 1/10 of the contract price of $100,000 for
services in completing 1/10 of the construction, and $5,500 for
services involving negotiations for the purchase of lumber.
11.
defendant

The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to

for the sum of $1,800 which represents defendants'

-5-
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costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants'
east side retaining wall.
12.

The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to

defendants in the amount of $2,000 which represents defendants'
costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants'
west side concrete steps.
13.

The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to

defendants in the amount of $559, which represents defendants'
costs for plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary Glu-Lam beams.
14.

The

Court

concludes

plaintiff

is

entitled

to

pre-judgment interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum,
from November 1, 1990, the date defendants terminated plaintiff's
services, to April 17, 1992, the date this Court granted plaintiffs1

Motion

to

Compel

Filing

of

Findings

of

post-judgment interest at the rate of twelve percent

Fact,

and

(12%) per

annum from and after April 17, 1992.
DATED this

^

day of

CA^C

» , 1992.

BY THE COURT:

HOMER WILKINSON
District Court Judge

1UCE J. NELSON
Attorney for Plaintiff

**'«IMIHU»«»*
''"'laiuiK

WJE/052092A
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ADDENDUM B

ADDENDUM B

iiLED

SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150)
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276)
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

Clerk o\ Summit County.
BY

"'iiputyCUA

dt>

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC.,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
STANLEY M. KURZET, an
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees
for THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST;
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and
John Does 1 through 10,

Civil No. 10870

Defendants.
* * * * * * * *

This action came on for trial before the Court, the
Honorable Homer Wilkinson, District Judge, presiding, and the
issues, having been duly tried to the Court, and the Court having
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That plaintiff recover from defendants in quantum

meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between plaintiff

BOOKNN PAGE 7 0 5
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and defendants, the amount of $11,141.00, with interest thereon
at the legal rate provided by law in accordance with paragraph 4
below, which represents $10,000 for services rendered in directing and supervising l/10th of the construction of defendants1
residence, and $5,500 for plaintiff's services involving negotiations for the purchase of lumber, adjusted by applying as an offset the following awards to defendants:
a.
dants' costs

The sum of $1,800 which represents defen-

in repairing plaintiff's

faulty construction of

defendants' east side retaining wall;
b.
dants' costs

The sum of $2,000 which represents defen-

in repairing plaintiff's

faulty

construction of

defendants' west side concrete steps; and
c.

The sum of $559 which represents defendants'

costs caused by plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary materials;
2.

That defendants are not entitled to attorneys'

fees and costs attributable to defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment;
3.

That plaintiff is awarded $542.40 as its costs of

court itemized as follows :
a.

Filing fee, $75,00;

b.

Service of process fees, $32.25;

c.

Kurzet deposition; $311.15;

-2-
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4.

d.

Bailey/Kent depositions, $99.00; and

e.

Expert witness fee, $25.00.

That plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment inter-

est on $11,141.00 at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum for
the

period

from

November

1,

1990

to April

17,

1992, and

post-judgment interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from and after April 17, 1992; and
5.

That

defendant's

counterclaims

are hereby dis-

missed with prejudice.
day of

DATED this

, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

7Z.
HOMER WILKINSON
District Court Judge

£*/• summer

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

; . COUATV
JRUCE J. NELSON
Attorney for Plaintiff

WJE/052292B
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ADDENDUM C

a**.

A G R E E M E N T
This Agreement covers all of the understandings existing
between BAILEY-ALLEN (Contractor) and STANLEY KURZET (Owner) for
the construction of a residence on LOT #4 of the EVERGREEN
development at DEER VALLEY, PARK CITY, UTAH.
The Contractor is retained by Owner on a cost plus fixed fee
basis. Costs shall be billed monthly and payment shall be made
within ten days of receipt of billing. The fee fixed for this
contract is set at $100,000 for the residence as depicted in the
drawings plus a maximum of $50,000 in directed additional work, if
any. Any directed additional work in excess of an aggregate cost
of $50,000 will result in additional fees based on 7% of the cost
of such additional work.
All billing incorporating costs involving subcontractors or
suppliers will be supported by copies of invoices clearly showing
that the services were performed and/or materials delivered at the
job site and shall further carry the notation by Contractor that
the billing is true and correct.
In the event that Owner's absence from Park City would result
in failing to pay Contractor in a timely manner as set forth above,
Contractor may Fax the billing to Owner and Owner shall cause
payment to by made by express mail or electronic transfer directly
to Contractors account, however, when such payment is made, Owner
reserves the right to review and obtain adjustment if indicated
pending the opportunity to review the records and work performed
upon Owner's return.
Both Contractor and Owner stipulate that this contract cannot
be changed except and unless in writing, bearing the date and
signatures of both parties.
The residence shall be constructed in accordance with the
drawings and no change will be made without the express written
consent of Owner. All changes will be covered by a written Change
Order in the form of EXHIBIT A attached hereto, describing the
nature of the change, the resulting differential in costs and the
impact on completion schedule if any and be dated and approved by
both Owner and Contractor.
The work is to be performed in accordance with a schedule
prepared by Contractor and the structure completed by April 15,
1991 and a Temporary Certificate of Occupancy shall have been
obtained by that date. The only Item permissible to be outstanding
on the TCO is landscaping. A schedule in the general form of
Exhibit B, prepared by Contractor shall be the definitive document
for assessing whether work is or is not progressing on schedule.
The residence

was designed through the cooperative effort of
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Mark Walker, the Architect and Owner. Any questions pertaining to
the structure should be directed to Mark Walker or his associate,
Stan Johnson. If the architect fails to respond and such continued
failure will cause increased construction costs, Owner is to be
notified at the earliest possible moment so that he has the
opportunity to mitigate such costs. The Owner shall not be liable
for increased costs occasioned by such delays in response or
recovery from drawing or design errors where the Contractor failed
to notify Owner before the increased costs were so incurred.
The Owner will have review authority and right of refusal on
subcontracts and material purchases. The Contractor will obtain
competitive bids for services and materials in sufficient time to
permit a review of a maximum of one week duration by Owner and if
necessary, select an alternative supplier without impact on
schedule or cost. Every effort will be made by the Contractor to
locate, solicit and select suppliers sufficiently in advance of
need to prevent the forced acceptance of an uneconomic bid because
a delay would be as costly or more costly than the loss arising
from the uneconomic bid. All bids will provide sufficient detail
to permit an intelligent analysis of the value of such bid. Time
and material bids will at minimum state the proposed hourly rates
for each category of labor and the percentage of fees and all other
costs to be passed on to Owner for labor and material. Both fixed
price and T&M bids will adequately identify the materials to be
provided as to quantity, type, grade, model and manufacturer as
applicable.
The Owner's review authority notwithstanding, the Contractor
is fully responsible to Owner for the performance of
subcontractors. Accordingly, costs occasioned by the failure of a
subcontractor to perform shall not be assessable to Owner.
The Contractor shall carry insurance specifically providing for
saving Owner harmless from any action arising due to the injury of
a worker even if an employ of a subcontractor or supplier who is
not properly or adequately insured. Contractor shall, within 10
days of the date of this agreement furnish a Certificate of
Insurance prepared by the Carrier or its Authorized Agent. The
Certificate shall specifically state the purpose and limits of the
policy and these shall show that the work to be performed under
this contract is covered.
Owner specifically states and Contractor acknowledges that
Owner and only Owner is empowered to direct the Contractor to incur
cost unforeseen by the plans and specifications that are in excess
of an aggregate of $1,000 (one thousand Dollars) for any given
category. A category is defined as a class of event such as work
performed in accordance with a plan error that must be corrected,
or need to perform additional work as a result of inclement
weather, or rework directed by the City Inspector and similarly
reasonably unforseeable events. Accordingly, any costs arising
from the performance of a directive from any person whomsoever
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other than Owner which are in excess of the $1,000 aggregate per
category limit, will not be reimbursable under this agreement.
Therefore, in order for cost arising from any ordered changes or
rework to be reimbursable to Contractor, such work must be
described and authorized in writing. However, the Owner will not
unreasonably withhold approval for any proposed additional work
which may in the opinion of# Architect, Contractor, Inspector,
Engineer, members of Owner s family or others be deemed necessary
or desirable.
The Contractor warrants that the residence will be free of of
defects in workmanship and materials and shall, at no expense to
Owner, correct any such defect for a period of one year from the
date of the Temporary Certificate of Occupancy. The Contractor's
liability in this regard specifically extends to consequential
damage as may occur as a direct result of such deficiency in
workmanship, and material. The Contractor's warranty liability
does not extend to work performed or materials provided by Owner or
to any consequence arrising therefrom.
Contractor takes note that Owner is concerned about the
quality of workmanship and materials and that this concern stems
from prior experience with a local contractor and ownership of
several condominiums at the Pinnacle development. Owner will not
make unreasonable demands, however, slovenly workmanship and/or
substandard materials will neither be accepted or paid for by
Owner. Owner considers that the fees he pays to Contractor are
specifically for his expertise in selecting and supervising workers
so as to avoid unacceptable and substandard workmanship and/or the
use of substandard quality materials.
Both Owner and Contractor stipulate that time is of the
essence and both will make every effort to reach the other as
expeditiously as possible. The Owner and Contractor can be
contacted as set forth in Exhibit C.
In the event Owner will not be at either of these locations,
Owner will leave or fax a schedule indicating where he can be
reached on any given day.
In the event Contractor is not available, he shall leave word
as to who is authorized to act for Contractor.
Entered into this Third Day Of July, 1990 at Park City, Utah.
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7CONTRACTOR,

l" OWNER

EXHIBIT A
C H A N G E

O R D E R

In connection with the construction of the Kurzet residence on Lot
#4 Evergreen, Mountainland Builders is hereby authorized to perforin
the following specific work and to supply the materials and
services as needed for such performance.
WORK DESCRIPTION

UNDERSTANDINGS
The cost differential of the above described work shall be:

The affect on schedule of the described work shall be:

APPROVALS

CONTRACTOR

DATE

OWNER
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EXHIBIT C
TO CONTACT CONTRACTOR
Office:

P.O. Box 11074
Salt Lake City, UT
84147

Richard Allen

Tel. 801-973-7888

Michael Kent

801-466-4169

Park City Mobil

645-8450..1118

Salt Lake Mobil

534-0429.. 115.8

Work Site

TBD

Jeremy Ranch

645-8449

TO CONTACT OWNER
Park City:

Tel. 645-9269
Fax 645-8622
Mobile 801-573-4453
PO Box 680670

1250 Pinnacle Drive
Park City, UT 68048
Oregon Ranch:

Tel. 503-888-9269
Fax

503-888-6055

PO Box 5039

Charleston Station
Charleston, OR 97420
Tahiti

Box Postal 21164
Papeete
French Polynesia

Direct dial
from USA

011-689-532-235

Aircraft:

Direct Dial 402-931-1124

Mobile:

801-573-4453
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ADDENDUM D

ADDENDUM D.l
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) (1992)

(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment The clerk must
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.)

ADDENDUM D.2
Utah Rule of AppeUate Procedure 32 (1992)

Rule 32. Interest on judgment.
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is
affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date
the judgment was entered in the trial court.

ADDENDUM D.3

Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1(7)

(7) In any suit upon a payment bond under this
chapter, the court shall award reasonable attorneys'
fees to the prevailing party.
1989

ADDENDUM D.4
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2 (1992)

14-2-2. Failure of owner to obtain payment
bond — Liability.
(1) Any owner who fails to obtain a payment bond
is liable to each person who performed labor or service or supplied equipment or materials under the
contract for the reasonable value of the labor or service performed or the equipment or materials furnished up to but not exceeding the contract price.
(2) No action to recover on this liability may be
commenced after the expiration of one year after the
day on which the last of the labor or service was performed or the equipment or material was supplied by
the person.
(3) In an action for failure to obtain a bond, the
court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party. These fees shall be taxed as costs in
the action.
ira

ADDENDUM D.5
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1992)

38-1-18. Attorneys' fees.
In any action brought to enforce any lien under this
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action. 1961

